Overview of Featured Simulations

Introduction

What's New

2016-10-05: Added a few simulations based on 2006, 2008, and 2011 elections. See the second table on the All Systems page.

2016-10-12: Added AV+ to the list of featured systems. Several changes to the Vote Swing Analysis graphs. Adjusted the Summary Statistics to account for constitutional considerations on provinces for the Proportional MPs column.

2016-10-30: Added a number of systems at the request of the ERRE Committee that meet a specific set of constraints.

2017-07-05:

A new system, LocalPR, for highly constrained situations. For more on this system (including models!), see localpr.ca.

2021-09-22: Including simulations based on 2019 and 2021 federal elections and stripping out some of the more obscure systems from the original modelling.

This web site presents the results of simulating 18 electoral systems. Others have done individual simulations of their favourite systems, but this is believed to be the first which uses a consistent approach on so many. This page features the 18 systems I view as most interesting. For the full list of 18 simulations, please see the "All Systems" item in the "Overview" menu, above.

Each of these 18 systems is described at the bottom of this page.

There is a lot of data here. It's not for the faint of heart. Perhaps the best way to dive in is to start with the associated submission to the Parlimentary Electoral Reform Committee.

With respect to the Committee's first principle of Effectiveness and Legitimacy, the recommendations based on this modelling is that:

  • the Committee issue a preliminary report stating that the Alternative Vote would be a step backward from FPTP and should not be considered further;
  • the Committee strongly consider Rural-Urban PR, a highly proportional, made-in-Canada system that effectively deals with our diverse riding sizes;
  • if choosing STV, the Committee think carefully about whether having smaller multi-member ridings is worth the decreased proportionality;
  • if choosing MMP, the Committee should stipulate that FPTP (rather than AV) continues to be used in the local riding elections;
  • the Committee avoid MMP-Lite’s substantial increase in complexity for very little gain in proportionality.

It should be noted, of course, that all simulations make assumptions and that any change to the voting system would change how people vote. So actual results will surely be somewhat different from any simulation. Nevertheless, these simulations show us important properties about the systems we are considering that can help guide our decision-making.

Proportionality

Alternative Vote-20181240-13%10%8%0%-4%13.5%13.5%47%98%2018
Alternative Vote-2014107017%-10%-1%0%-5%14.6%14.6%47%94%2014
Alternative Vote-2011107016%-5%-7%0%-3%12.6%12.6%47%96%2011
Alternative Vote-2007107026%-11%-6%0%-8%21.1%21.1%48%91%2007
Alternative Vote-2003103025%-14%-7%0%-3%21.3%21.3%50%96%2003
Alternative Vote-199910301%4%-3%0%-1%3.9%3.9%52%97%1999
Alternative Vote-19951300-3%12%-6%0%-0%9.8%9.8%50%97%1995
Alternative Vote-19901300-5%-14%26%0%-1%21.1%21.1%44%93%1990
Alternative Vote-1987130034%-22%-10%0%-0%29.5%29.5%49%98%1987
First-Past-The-Post-20181240-14%21%-1%0%-4%17.9%17.9%48%98%2018
First-Past-The-Post-2014107016%-5%-4%0%-5%12.4%12.4%47%94%2014
First-Past-The-Post-2011107012%-1%-7%0%-3%9.9%9.9%47%96%2011
First-Past-The-Post-2007107024%-7%-7%0%-8%19.4%19.4%48%91%2007
First-Past-The-Post-2003103023%-11%-8%0%-3%19.4%19.4%50%96%2003
First-Past-The-Post-19991030-6%12%-4%0%-1%10.0%10.0%52%97%1999
First-Past-The-Post-19951300-8%18%-7%0%-0%15.0%15.0%50%97%1995
First-Past-The-Post-19901300-5%-8%19%0%-1%15.4%15.4%44%93%1990
First-Past-The-Post-1987130026%-12%-11%0%-0%21.7%21.7%50%98%1987

Footnotes

  1. Number of Local MPs is the total number of MPs representing specific ridings. Those ridings may be either single-member ridings or multi-member.
  2. Number of Regional MPs is the total number of MPs that represent multiple ridings. This happens in systems with top-up seats such as MMP and RU-PR.
  3. Over-Representation by Party is the percentage of MPs in Parliament minus the percentage of the popular vote. For example, in 2015 under FPTP the Liberals received 54.4% of the seats but only 39.5% of the vote for an over-representation of (54.4 - 39.5) = 14.9%. Negative numbers mean the party was under-represented.
  4. Gallagher Index is a measure of disproportionality. It combines both over and under-representation for each party into a single number. Gallagherindicies less than 5 are excellent.
  5. Gallagher Index 2015 is the Gallagher Index for the simulated 2015 election.
  6. Gallagher Index Composite is the average of the Gallagher Indices for each province and territory, weighted by its number of seats. This corrects for a problem in calculating the Gallagher Index for the nation as a whole, which can can hide regional disproportionalities such as the significant over-representation of Conservatives in the Prairies offsetting the over-representation of Liberals in the Maritimes.
  7. % Voters with Preferred Local MP is the percentage of voters who have an MP representing their riding from the same party as their first choice candidate. Systems with multi-member ridings will do better under this measure.
  8. % Voters with Preferred Regional MP is the percentage of voters who have an MP representing their region from the same party as their first choice candidate. Systems with top-up seats will do better under this measure.
  9. Short System Name is a very consise abbreviation of the key parameters for this simulation.

Observations

  • FPTP in 2015 gave the Liberals an undeserved 15% over-representation of MPs, just like it did for the Conservatives in 2011. These graphs shows that as the spread in the vote becomes larger, the spread in MPs grows even faster. For every percent the Liberals can increase their vote, their share of MPs goes up by more than 3%.

  • Many commentators have noted that AV favours centrist parties like the Liberals. These simulations illustrate just how true that is. Replaying the 2015 election with AV gives the Liberals 24% more MPs than deserved based on the popular vote.

  • Some MPs might consider keeping the current 338 local ridings and adding 10% - 15% more MPs to give a measure of proportionality. These simulations and the table above show, however, that such a tepid response moves us towards proportionality but doesn't really get us there. With similar design parameters (338 MPs in local ridings; 15% more MPs) the Rural-Urban Proportional (RUP) model does far better.

  • Simulating swings in voter preferences shows that most of the proportional systems remain proportional even as the gap between the first-place and second-place finishers increases. These can be seen in the Vote Swing Analysis graphs produced on the Summary page for each model as well as the "Average Gallagher Index" in the chart above.

    The Gallagher Index is a measure of disproportionality. Numbers below 5% are good. The Average Gallagher Index is the average taken across many simulations done for the voter swing analysis.

    Unfortunately, MMP with only a small top-up layer does not perform well on this measure.

  • All of the parties are currently disadvantaged by FPTP. The Liberals are disadvantaged in the prairie provinces while the Conservatives and NDP are disadvantaged in the eastern provinces and particularly in the Maritimes. The Greens, of course, are disadvantaged nearly everywhere. By the same token, a proportional system would advantage each party in different areas of the country.

Model Summary

Proportional electoral systems have many design parameters that can be tweaked. This table has two rows for each model. The bottom row applies to the riding; the top row applies to the region.

The first column of that table gives the name of the riding design (top) and the election algorithm used and the year of the election it's based on (bottom). The riding design specifies a particular mapping from old (e.g. 2015) ridings to new ridings, how the new ridings are gathered into regions, and finally how the regions are gathered by province. Riding designs are described in more detail at the bottom of this page and by following the riding design link.

Region# Tot Seats% SeatsAvg # Seats/RegionAvg #Reg/ProvAvg Adjust Seats / Region
RidingYear# Tot Seats% SeatsAvg # Seats/Riding% Single% MultipleComp. Gallagher
fptp00%0.01.0
AV1987130100%1.0100%0%29.5%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV1990130100%1.0100%0%21.1%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV1995130100%1.0100%0%9.8%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV1999103100%1.0100%0%3.9%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV2003103100%1.0100%0%21.3%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV2007107100%1.0100%0%21.1%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV2011107100%1.0100%0%12.6%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV2014107100%1.0100%0%14.6%
fptp00%0.01.0
AV2018124100%1.0100%0%13.5%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP1987130100%1.0100%0%21.7%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP1990130100%1.0100%0%15.4%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP1995130100%1.0100%0%15.0%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP1999103100%1.0100%0%10.0%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP2003103100%1.0100%0%19.4%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP2007107100%1.0100%0%19.4%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP2011107100%1.0100%0%9.9%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP2014107100%1.0100%0%12.4%
fptp00%0.01.0
MMP_FPTP2018124100%1.0100%0%17.9%

Representation

The Representation table focuses on how voters are represented by MP.

Alternative Vote-201812401241.031,7030
Alternative Vote-201410701071.045,0510
Alternative Vote-201110701071.045,0510
Alternative Vote-200710701071.045,0510
Alternative Vote-200310301031.043,6620
Alternative Vote-199910301031.043,6620
Alternative Vote-199513001301.031,9870
Alternative Vote-199013001301.031,9870
Alternative Vote-198713001301.031,9870
First-Past-The-Post-201812401241.031,7030
First-Past-The-Post-201410701071.045,0510
First-Past-The-Post-201110701071.045,0510
First-Past-The-Post-200710701071.045,0510
First-Past-The-Post-200310301031.043,6620
First-Past-The-Post-199910301031.043,6620
First-Past-The-Post-199513001301.031,9870
First-Past-The-Post-199013001301.031,9870
First-Past-The-Post-198713001301.031,9870

Footnotes

  1. Number of Local MPs is the total number of MPs representing a specific riding. That riding may be either a single-member riding or a multi-member riding.
  2. Number of Regional MPs is the total number of MPs that represent multiple ridings. This happens in systems with top-up seats such as MMP and RU-PR.
  3. Number of MPs is the sum of the local and regional MPs, or how many seats in Parliament is assumed by this model.
  4. Average Local MPs/Riding is the average number of MPs representing a local riding. Forsystems that have single-member ridings everywhere such as FPTP and MMP, it will be 1.0. For systems that have at least some multi-member ridings such as STV and RU-PR it will be largerthan 1.0.
  5. Average Top-up Seats/Region is useful for systems like MMP and RU-PR where it gives the average number of seats in the top-up region.
  6. Average Total MPs/Region is the average number of MPs representing a region -- the sum of all the local MPs in that region plus the MPs in top-up seats for that region.
  7. Population/Local MP is the total Canadian population divided by the number of local MPs.
  8. Area Represented by Median Local MP is a measure of the area covered by a local MP. In this case 50% of the ridings are smaller than the area (given in square kilometeres) and 50% of the ridings are larger.
  9. Short System Name is a very consise abbreviation of the key parameters for this simulation.

Riding Design Descriptions

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

fptp

FPTP for Ontario elections.

Election Strategy Descriptions

Election strategies are the specifics of how ballots are counted to determine which candidate fills a seat. Each strategy has three parts: how single-member ridings are handled, how multi-member ridings are handled, and finally how top-up or adjustment seats are handled.

AV

Single-Member Ridings:

During the election in each riding, votes were transferred in two steps. First, if a member of party X is eliminated and there are other members of party X still in the race, ALL of the votes are split equally between the remaining members of party X.

When the last member of a party is eliminated, the votes are transferred according to the following table.

Xfer from↓ to→BlocCCFCHPCORComConFCPFreeGrnIndLabProgLbtLibLibLabLibProgM-LNAPNDPNLPOthPPC
Bloc23142010
CCF
CHP
COR
Com
Con610121812
FCP
Free
Grn1581622
Ind
LabProg
Lbt
Lib2178462
LibLab
LibProg
M-L
NAP
NDP21218393
NLP
Oth
PPC30

This table is based on 2021 Ipsos polling reported here augmented with guesses about PPC transfers and Green transfers.

Ideally, we would have different tables for each region of the country (at least Quebec and the rest of Canada) as well as for each election year. But we don’t. The same table is currently used everywhere.

Source: https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/canadians-remain-open-to-changing-their-vote-as-debates-loom

Multi-Member Ridings:

An election strategy for where none are applicable. For example, for multi-member ridings in a FPTP simulation.

Top-up or Adjustments:

A placeholder election strategy for where no top-up strategy is applicable.

FPTP

Single-Member Ridings:

After collapsing all candidates running for the same party into one virtual candiate, choose the virtual candidate with the most votes.

Multi-Member Ridings:

An election strategy for where none are applicable. For example, for multi-member ridings in a FPTP simulation.

Top-up or Adjustments:

A placeholder election strategy for where no top-up strategy is applicable.